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PUBLIC CONTRACT-
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CLAUSES IN
NEW YORK STATE
IRA SCHLUSSELBERG*
For almost a complete century the American courts have
been in conflict as to the most desirable mode of treating con-
tracts made by two parties for the benefit of a third.' The
point of departure in the development of any clear-cut answer
to this problem is a theory with which almost every American
jurisdiction will agree; that privity between the plaintiff and
the defendant is a necessary prerequisite to the maintenance
of any action upon a contract either in law or in equity.
One school of thought concludes that since there can be no
direct enforcement of the third party beneficiary agreement
against the one to be benefited, by equitable justice there ought
to be no enforcement permitted by the third party against either
of the contracting individuals, particularly the promisor.2 This
theory is found to be fallacious when it is seen that where "A"
makes a contract with "B" for the benefit of "C", although
"B" may enforce "A's" obligation to "C," and "A" may re-
quire performance by "B" toward "C," it is often probable
that there will be little or no interest in so doing.
As sometimes occurs, "A" or "B" may die or leave the
scene soon after making the contract. The ends of justice
would require some interested person to be empowered to ser-
iously enforce the obligation to "C". In theory, both primary
parties possess enforceable rights. 3 In practice, however, num-
* A.B., New York University; LL.B., Columbia University,
formerly connected with Columbia Law Review. Address: Gale,
Bernays, Falk, Eisner & Nathan, Forty Wall Street, New York 5,
New York.
One of the earliest cases is that of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y.
268 (1859).
2This argument results from the theory of Mutuality of
Obligations.
The argument that the entire contract is voidable for lack of
mutuality is not tenable since "A" possesses the right to enforce
"B's" obligation should he desire so to do. Furthermore, "B"
definitely possesses the right to enforce "A's" obligations.
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erous situations arise where one will never attempt to enforce
the obligation of the other.
4
Whether we view the problem as moral, ethical, legal or
equitable, an injustice would be committed against "C". To a
degree the problem is solved by adhering to the majority rule
and permitting the third party himself to enforce a contract
made for his benefit. 5 The English-Mlassachusetts rule, how-
ever, permits a contract to be enforced solely by or against per-
sons who are parties to its making.6
'There are two usual situations where a contract contains
a clause expressly for the benefit of a third party:
I. Where the third party is a child or wife of either
of the contracting individuals, the latter is under a legal and
moral duty to support and benefit the child or wife.
II. The promisee is under another type of obligation
to the third party, usually contractual.
(1) A monetary obligation may exist between the
promisee and the third party.
(2) The promisee may owe to the third party legal
protection or obligation such as is encountered in a public
works indemnity contract.
In both I and II, supra, the third party may maintain an
action under the contract, for he is, in an extended sense, a
"creditor beneficiary."
The New York Courts have been singularly reluctant to
grant permission to a simple donee beneficiary to enforce a con-
tract since there is, by the simple definition of "donee bene-
ficiary" no obligation, legal or moral, running from the
promisee to the beneficiary, which obligation could be enforced
by the beneficiary in a separate and independent action.
When we look at situations of creditor beneficiaries, 7 how-
ever, it is seen that there is an independent obligation running
directly from the promisee to the beneficiary which may be en-
forced by the latter against the former. Therein, lies the dis-
'Little difficulty is encountered where either "A" or "B" is
laboring under an independent obligation to "C".
'See note 1, supra.
" This is the minority viewpoint. The leading case is Exchange
Bank v. Rise, 107 Mass. 37 (1871).
See I and II, supra.
CONTRACTs-THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES
tinction. The underlying reaction of the New York Courts
is that in a creditor beneficiary situation the beneficiary has
parted with a valuable consideration or inducement in ex-
change for the benefit to be obtained'by him from the third
party beneficiary contract.8 A donee beneficiary on the other
hand has exchanged nothing of value 9 As a result, he is re-
quired to remain in the position he held before the promisee
and promisor contracted.
Surmise this situation. The City of New York has con-
tracted with construction company "X" to erect a municipal
building. Because of operations requiring the use of dangerous
explosives, high pressure drilling machinery or high voltage
wires, the contract contains a clause obligating the contractor
to compensate third persons injured or damaged as a result of
the construction operations.
If during the course of operations the building of one
William Brown is damaged, Brown would have a cause of action
in tort against the City since the latter is the owner of the of-
fending property and is the principal.' However, there are
basic advantages in proceeding against the contractor directly
upon the terms of the third party beneficiary clause in the con-
'The "valuable inducement" is carefully distinguished from
"legal consideration", since it is highly conceivable that situations
will be encountered where this type of inducement would be
insufficient to independently support an executory contract, but
should more correctly be termed the "motive" for entering into
the contract. However, when we are confronted with a valid
contract made upon adequate legal consideration between promisee
and promisor, this "valuable inducement" is considered sufficient,
if flowing from the beneficiary to the promisee, to place the bene-
ficiary in somewhat of a privity with the promisor, thereby per-
mitting him to sue. Solely for this discussion we must also be
careful to distinguish "valuable consideration" from "legal con-
sideration" so as not to create the impression that there is a sep-
arate and distinct contract between the promisee and beneficiary.
The "valuable consideration" may, however, in various situa-
tions be of sufficient value to be included under the term of "legal
consideration" and thereby be the basis of an independent executory
contract, i. e. since a husband is legally required to furnish support
to his wife, there is sufficient legal consideration to uphold a contract
between husband and wife covering such support.
Nothing of value either from the legal standpoint or from that
of the layman.
"'The injured party would be entitled to compensation for
injuries sustained as a result of the use of the inherently dangerous
material, because of cases headnoted by Fletcher v. Ryland, note 20,
infra.
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tract with the city. One advantage of such procedure would be
to circumvent the technical and tedious requirements found in
suing a municipality. 1
Still another obvious advantage obtained by proceeding
against the contractor on his contract is found in the statute of
limitations. In New York the period is three years for a prop-
erty tort while it is six years on a contract action. 12  Should
Brown be permitted to proceed upon the contract as a third
party beneficiary he would be greatly benefited by the longer
period in which to institute his action.
13
Because of these serious advantages a wise plaintiff will
take great pains to frame his complaint in contract rather than
in tort.14  Moreover, this is especially true where he is pro-
ceeding against a financially responsible construction company.'5
The famous case of Lawrence v. Fox,16 decided in 1859, set
forth a doctrine which would have permitted almost every third
party beneficiary to sue upon the contract where he could
demonstrate the slightest legal obligation, expressed or implied,
upon the part of the promisee toward him. To have followed
that doctrine blindly would have thrown wide the doors to all
types and forms of third party beneficiary actions. The simple
holding in the Lawrence case permitted a creditor beneficiary
to sue upon the contract. The complications of that decision,
however, were much broader.
Most large municipalities in the United States require pre-
liminary notice from, and examination of, plaintiffs in tort actions
against the municipality.
'N.Y. C.P.A. sec. 49, subd. 7 as added by L. 1936, ch. 558, in
effect September 1, 1936, Code sec. 380, 383, and 394.
There is usually a shorter Statute of Limitations encountered
when proceeding against a municipality.
The longer period of time is of great assistance in personal
injury actions where it is difficult to determine the extent of the
disability until after a reasonable lapse of time.
"Plaintiff should be quite careful at this point to emphasize
in his complaint the contract element of his action and where he
is able to show a cause of action by so doing, he should also lessen
the tort aspects.
I Where the contractor is not in a sound financial condition, it
is beneficial to proceed directly against the municipality.
I "A" loaned money to "B" upon a promise by "B" to pay a
debt -owed by "A" to "C". The court held that "C" (Lawrence)
was possessed of a cause of action against "B" (Fox) despite the
fact that "C" had no knowledge of the contract between "A" and
"B" when said contract was entered into. The holding was based
upon the theory that the contract was made for the benefit of "C"
and subsequently adopted by "C".
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Subsequently, the line of cases headnoted by Vroonman v.
Turiier1 7 narrowed the category of creditor beneficiary to
where it was applicable only to the situation of a promisee owing
a distinct duty to the beneficiary which the promisor obligates
himself to fulfill.
1
8
Although following the definition of "creditor beneficiary"
as laid down in the Lawrence case and more closely defined in
the Vroozan case, the New York courts, for the last fifty years,
have tended to expand the category and to locate, in numerous
borderline situations, a duty by the promisee to the beneficiary.
The foremost example is that of public construction contracts.
Although an injured pedestrian would find it quite com-
plicated to sue a municipality for tortious injury incurred dur-
ing municipal construction, he would be presented with much
less difficulty in proceeding against the builder upon his pub-
lic contract with the city.19 When suing ex contract a the plain-
tiff is assisted by a ruling that "a municipality is duty bound
to protect the interests of its inhabitants. "20
For the facts to permit the injured party to enforce the
contract it must be shown that:
A. The municipality intended, by contract, to secure for
its residents some benefit in the event of injury.
B. The municipality was duty bound to take reasonable
steps to protect the interests of its residents from injury.
It is, therefore, seen that the present state of the law in
New York is that where a builder is doing work for a municipal-
ity and an agreement exists between the said builder and the
municipality placing upon the former the burden of compen-
sation, one injured as a result of operations may proceed di-
rectly against the contractor. In one prominent case the
builder attempted to defend the suit of an injured property own-
er by proving that his municipal contract was purely one of
indemnity and as a result he was to be liable only in the event
that the city was successfully forced to pay for damages result-
7 69 N. Y. 280 (1877); cf. Lorillarde v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 498
(1890).
:'Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236 (1922).
"These contracts now almost invariably contain a clause
obligating the builder to assume primary liability or to save the
municipality harmless from any action by third parties resulting
from the construction.
'Rigney v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 217 N. Y. 31 (1916).
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ing from the operations. The court, however, refused to sustain
this defense and permitted the injured party to proceed directly
against the builder.
The majority rule in questions of a builder's tort liability
for the use of explosives or other inherently dangerous materials,
as first laid down in Fletcher v. Rylavd,2 1 held that a builder
was liable as an insurer for any and all injuries resulting from
the use of inherently dangerous articles in his work, even with
reasonable care. The dangerous article is retained and employed
at the user's peril. He would be, therefore, liable for any and
all injuries from its escape. This is the doctrine of absolute
liability, and leads to a result more violent than that of res
ipsa loquitur.
The courts of New York have modified the pure Fletcher
majority rule and do not hold the builder absolutely liable in all
situations. Under the modification, the user of an inherently
dangerous article is held strictly accountable to a high degree of
reasonable care. He is required to take absolute steps to use the
correct size of charge or voltage and to take all reasonable care
to prevent injury to persons or property. If he does this there
is no liability for resulting tort damages.
2 2
Stated in other words, the New York rule, a slight modifica-
tion of the majority rule, places upon the plaintiff in a tort
action the burden of proving specific negligence in order to re-
cover against the contractor for the tort. This is so whether or
not the contractor's liability has resulted from a municipal con-
tract. When utilizing the contract theory, the plaintiff must
prove:
A. The existence of a contract.
B. His right to sue upon it as a third party beneficiary
C. The extent of his injuries.
D. That said injuries resulted from the unreasonable use
of explosives.
In the situation of inherently dangerous objects, the contract
plaintiff is relieved of the strenuous burden of proving the
specific negligence required by the New York rule.
In conclusion, it can be noted that the cases demonstrate a
"Blackburn, L. J. 3 H. L. 333 (Eng.) (1865).
'Cohen v. Cooley, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 101 (1939).
"Lossee v. Buchanann, 51 N. Y. 476 (1873); Booth v. Rome,
W. & 0. T. R. Co., 140 N. Y. 267 (1893).
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distinct trend toward opening wide the doors to third party bene-
ficiary suits upon public contracts. 24 Jurisdictions such as Eng-
land and 'Massachusetts, limiting themselves by the minority
rule,"  may possibly be moved by the same trend toward the
adoption of a face-saving theory by which the third party bene-
ficiary would be termed an informal assignee of the contract,
thereby possessing enforceable legal rights.26 When the third
party gives to the promisee a valuable inducement (especially
where the inducement is sufficiently important to be called
"legal consideration") in return for the benefit which the prom-
isee has obtained for him from the promisor, there is additional
reason for pressing the theory of informal assignment.27 It may
be said that the promisee has assigned his rights in the contract
to the third party in return for the valuable inducement or legal
consideration and therefore the third party has the undeniable
right to enforce the contract. Such a theory, developed and
broadened, may possibly lead to further freedom of contract.
"' This would have been the direct result of Lawrence v. Fox
had the courts not attempted to limit its sweeping implications.
"Not permitting the third party beneficiaries to sue upon con-
tracts to which they are not primary parties.
I' Such a theory would not require the jurisdiction to amend
its requirement of a creditor beneficiary, but would merely be a
mode whereby a new factual situation would be added to the
category.
" He is no longer a donee beneficiary but has been transformed
into a creditor beneficiary.
